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THE NON-DEMOCRATIC SIDE OF REGULAR SETS
GIORGIO LAGUZZI
Abstract. We analyse the role and the possible interpretations of reg-
ular sets studied in descriptive set theory and forcing theory from the
point of view of social choice theory and we provide some insights about
their non-democratic nature. Moreover we also show that equity and
Pareto principles can rule out the non-democratic aspects.
1. Introduction
The general question addressed by social choice theory is to extrapolate
a reasonable social choice out of a set of individual choices. Arrow’s original
result ([1]) proved the impossibility of a social choice function working on
three alternatives and satisfying Unanimity (U), Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) and Non-Dictatorship (ND); then in [12] Fishburn turned
Arrow’s theorem into a possibility result, showing that when dealing with
an infinite set of individuals the existence of such a social choice function is
somehow linked to the existence of non-principal ultrafilters, thus exhibiting
a connection between social choice functions satisfying a non-dictatorial be-
havior and non-constructive objects. Many variants and more results have
been extensively developed through the years by many other authors follow-
ing this line of research. For example, Lauwers and Van Liedekerke intro-
duced a more systematic model-theoretic approach in [18]; Litak provided a
game-theoretic approach with infinite games and the axiom of determinacy
in [19]; Mihara investigated the structure in terms of oracle computability
and Turing degrees of the social choice function and the invisible dictator of
Fishburn’s theorem in [20].
This paper proposes more insights from a slightly different perspective
about such a connection involving other irregular sets from set theory and
topology, and providing some interpretations in terms of social choice func-
tions. The use of irregular sets like non-Lebesgue, non-Ramsey sets have
been used also in connection with social welfare relations satisfying Pare-
tian principles, anonymity and other equity principles (e.g., Lauwers [17]
and Zame [22]).
Focusing on the part concerning social choice theory on countably infinite
population P , (with also a brief digression on the uncountable case in Sec-
tion 7), we want to study some non-constructive objects from topology and
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descriptive set theory, and show that the dependence faced by Fishburn of
more democratic social choice functions from non-constructive objects seems
to be not only due to the starting principles used by Arrow (U and IIA),
but probably hides a more structural motivation, and indeed even shows up
in case of two alternatives.
Since the paper somehow attempts to blend together a mostly social
choice-theoretic side and a mostly set-theoretic side, one needs to organize
the two parts accordingly. Section 2 is designed to discuss some motivations
in economic and social choice theory regarding the role of infinite popula-
tions, and so it can be seen mostly as a philosophical part. Section 3 starts
to introduce the more technical tools from set theory, focusing on the in-
terpretation in the framework of social choice theory, and thus it may be
understood as a bridge between the speculative part and the technical one.
From Section 4 on, we deeply go into the technical and set theoretical issues,
providing in the end the corollaries/interpretations in social choice theory
with a focus on the case with two alternatives. Section 5 is concerning the
case with more than two alternatives. In Section 6 we introduce equity and
Pareto principles for social welfare relations and prove that these principles
could be used to prevent anti-democratic social choice functions. Section 7
is a brief digression for uncountable populations. Finally, Section 8 summa-
rizes the concluding remarks about the use of the axiom of choice and the
axiom of determinacy in the context of social choice and economic theory.
2. Some considerations on infinite populations
The study and the analysis of models with infinitely many individuals has
a long-standing tradition in social choice and economic theory. Moreover in
such a context the use of set-theoretic axioms like the axiom of choice (AC)
and the axiom of determinacy (AD) has played a role. In this section, we
attempt to give some overview and a contribution about the discussion on
the role of infinite populations and the use of these axioms from mathemat-
ical logic. The overview is far from being exhaustive and it is just mainly
centered on what is pertaining mostly our further discussion. My position
will be moderately in favour of a use of some fragment of AC, and rather
positively oriented in analysing infinite populations.
In [19] Litak deals with an interesting and profound analysis and some
criticisms about some use of infinite populations and non-constructive ob-
jects in economic and social choice models. In particular, he suggests to take
in consideration as a method of selection of the legitimate use of AC (and
the suitable use of the infinite setting in general) the so-called Hildenbrand
criterion, asserting: “The relevance of the ideal case to the finite case has to
be established”. Although the paper remarkably contains a lot of stimulat-
ing insights and I agree with some positions expressed in that paper, and in
general with some criticisms, I would argue for a more optimistic position
about the use of infinite sets of individuals, and try to be more nuanced
THE NON-DEMOCRATIC SIDE OF REGULAR SETS 3
about the preference between AC and AD in this context. In this section
I mainly focus on the use of infinite population of individuals, and refer to
the last section on the concluding remarks for the discussion about AC and
AD.
In favor of an appropriate use of economic models with infinitely many
individuals is Aumann in his pioneering [3], where the author started a
systematic study of markets in perfect competition by using a continuum
of traders. The idea behind using infinitely many traders adopted by Au-
mann is that in analysing markets with perfect competition one needs a
model/framework where the influence of each individual participant in “neg-
ligible”. The author draws a parallel with the use of a continuum of particles
in fluid mechanics to support the idea that, even though idealized, it can
serve as a fruitful setting to understand the dynamic behavior of fluids, in
some cases more than by considering the whole fluid as composed by n-many
particles and studying the distinct movements of each particle. Beyond that,
a very significant passage is the following [3, pg. 41]:
“It should be emphasized that our consideration of a continuum of traders
is not merely a mathematical exercise; it is an expression of an economic
idea. This is underscored by the fact that the chief result holds only for a
continuum of traders - it is false for a finite number.”
This passage is rather important as it seems to suggest that the use of an
infinite amount of individuals permits to analyse a certain idealized economic
framework even better than the more realistic finite case, and moreover it
permits to state that this choice is not just “merely a mathematical exer-
cise; it is an expression of an economic idea”. Even if not stated explicitly,
it seems to be clear from that passage and from the context, that Aumann
is strongly supporting the idea of using infinitely many traders as the most
suitable model for perfect competition. We remark that the purpose here
is neither to support any preference between market economy in perfect
competition vs monopolistic economy, nor other issues regarding political
economy (which is far from the topic of this paper), but merely to stress
that Aumann suggests a choice of an infinite population based on a reason-
ing pertaining models for economic theory, and not just as a mathematical
abstraction. In [3] while Aumann seems to therefore be rather positively ori-
ented in the use of infinitely many traders, he seems to be suspicious about
an unrestricted use of AC, as stated on page 44: “Non-measurable sets are
extremely “pathological”; it is unlike that they would occur in the context of
an economic model”.
In [20] and [21] Mihara draws a connection between computability and so-
cial choice theory. The author expresses a rather positive approach in using
infinite populations. Specifically the author introduces also an interpreta-
tion and support some ideas that we find very suggestive. Beyond the usual
interpretation of an infinite population as consisting of infinitely many peo-
ple extending indefinitely through an infinite horizon, Mihara’s other idea
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relies on the observation that an infinite set of individuals need not be un-
derstood as an infinite set of physical persons only (which might make the
idealized setting rather abstract and unrealistic), but could perfectly be seen
in a framework where there is a finite set of different persons but there is
uncertainty described by a countably infinite set of states. As an explicit
example we mention the following passage [21, pg. 4]:
“This derivation of an infinite “society” as well as the domain restric-
tions might seem artificial. However, they are in fact natural and even
have some advantages. First, inter-state comparisons are avoided, in the
same sense that inter-personal comparisons are avoided in Arrow’s setting.
Second, in this formulation, people can express their preferences without es-
timating probabilities.”
Mihara provides also an explicit example to support this interpretation
([21, section 2.1.3]). As a contribution to support Mihara’s interpretation I
also suggest the following one.
Consider the case of a single person who has to make a choice between
two alternatives (i.e., two candidates a and b) and that this decision must
be explicitely make at a certain point in the coming future; meanwhile her
decision might “oscillates” depending on the particular instant we consider
before the voting time. More formally, let ts denote the instant where we
start to collect the preferences of the given person and tf be the final instant
when the decision will be made. If we interpret the time as a continuum we
could understood the interval [ts, tf ) as an infinite set (we can even reduce
the focus on the rational instants, so to have a countable dense set of instants
in [ts, tf )). In such a way we can see the final choice that the person will make
at the voting instant tf as a choice aggregating all individual choices made
in all preceding instants; for example, if the person has thought of giving a
preference to the candidate a instead of b in all instants, i.e. the sequence
of preference is of the form (a, a, a, a, a, . . . ), at instant tf we expect an
aggregating choice function giving a as the final choice (unanimity principle);
on the contrary if the person has denoted uncertainty, i.e., the sequence of
individuals choices is of the form (a, a, b, b, a, b, a, a, b, a, b, . . . ) then the final
aggregating choice will not be so clear. Hence under this interpretation the
final choice at instant tf can be analysed as an aggregating choice of all
rational instants in [ts, tf ). Note that the ordered sequence does not follow
the order in terms of time, but this should not be considered a priori so
bounding, since an aggregating choice function need not be influenced on
how the set of individuals is ordered, and in case of a countable set the well-
order does not require any use of AC. Also note that this simple example
could be seen as a particular case of Mihara’s setting, since the individual
choices at all rational instants t ∈ [ts, tf ) can be viewed as the states of
uncertainty described by Mihara. A possible objection might be that in this
example we treat tf as a kind of privileged instant, and not as the other t’s.
However this is justified by the fact that the specific final instant tf can be
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seen as the acme which aggregates all states of uncertainty preceding that
specific moment tf .
The reader interested in more details about the use of infinite populations
both in social choice theory and social welfare pre-orders, also in relation
with non-constructive objects could see the following selected list of papers:
[9], [12], [18] (about social choice functions), and [8], [17], [22], [2] (about
social welfare relations).
3. Examples, basic notions and irrelevant coalitions
Let us fix the general setting we aim to investigate. We focus on the case
of an alternative between two candidates 0, 1 and of a countably infinite
population P = ω. We will focus on the case with more alternatives (and
even countably infinite many) in Section 5. Given any individual i ∈ ω we
denote by x(i) ∈ {0, 1} the choice that the individual i makes between the
two candidates. The sequence x ∈ 2ω then represents all individual choices.
In this formalization, given a set F ⊆ 2ω we can see it as a choice function
assigning a value either 0 or 1 to a given sequence of individual preferences
x ∈ 2ω as follows
F (x) = 1⇔ x ∈ F.
Throughout the paper we will identify F ⊆ 2ω and its corresponding social
choice function on 2ω.
Given a partial function f : ω → {0, 1} we use the notation
Nf := {x ∈ 2
ω : ∀n ∈ dom(f)(x(n) = f(n))}.
Moreover given a set X and a subset A ⊆ X we use the notation Ac :=
X \ A, i.e. the complement of A.
We start with informally presenting an example that we then turn into a
more precise treatment in the second part of this section, and with further
results in the subsequent sections.
Definition 3.1. We defineNf to be a Silver condition iff the partial function
associated f : dom(f)→ {0, 1} is such that the complement of the domain
of f , in symbol dom(f)c, is infinite. We denote the set of all Silver conditions
by V.
It is well-known (and easy to check) that the Nf ’s form a basis for a
topology, which is called Silver topology or Doughnuts topology.
Definition 3.2. A set A ⊆ 2ω is said to satisfy the Silver property (or
V-property) iff
∃Nf ∈ V(Nf ⊆ A ∨Nf ∩A = ∅).
We refer to these sets also with the term Silver sets (or V-sets). A well-
known and easy argument shows that any set satisfying the Baire property
w.r.t. the Silver topology is also a Silver set. A standard application of
AC gives a non-Silver set. On the other side, it is possible to construct by
using the method of forcing a model of set theory without AC where all
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sets are Silver (see [6]). Non-Silver sets are usually considered irregular sets
from the point of view of descriptive set theory and so somehow they are
considered on the negative side. In what follows we give a first glance that,
on the contrary, from the point of view of social choice theory, non-Silver
sets seems to share a more positive side.
Interpretation in the social choice framework. Given a Silver condition
Nf put a := dom(f)
c. On the notation-side, in the context of social choice
theory, we often refer to a set of individuals as a coalition. Let us interpret
a as a coalition consisting of individuals who did not make a choice yet, and
f : ac → {0, 1} as the function assigning to any individual i ∈ ac = dom(f)
the corresponding choice f(i).
Now assume we pick a Silver set F , and so we can find a Silver condition
Nf such that Nf ⊆ F or Nf ∩ F = ∅. Equivalently we can say that
• ∀x ∈ Nf , F (x) = 0, or
• ∀x ∈ Nf F (x) = 1.
So assume for instance that the former case occurs, i.e. ∀x ∈ Nf , F (x) =
0. By definition of a Silver condition, every sequence of individual choices
x ∈ Nf has the property that every individual i ∈ a
c chooses f(i), i.e.
x(i) = f(i). That means that no matter what the individuals j ∈ a will
choose, the social choice function F assigns the value 0 to all sequences of
individual choices in Nf . In other words, the latter statement asserts that
the single choices of the infinitely many individuals of the coalition a are
irrelevant to determine the social choice assigned. An equivalent argument
of course holds in case ∀x ∈ Nf F (x) = 1.
Note that the argument above reveals a potentially non-democratic be-
havior of the social choice function F whenever such F is a Silver set, as it
ignores the choices of infinitely many individuals of the population. Or, put
it differently, if F is a social choice function which is a Silver set, then we can
find a co-infinite coalition that is already able to determine the social choice,
no matter what the other infinitely many individuals not in this coalition
will choose. On the contrary, if a social choice function is non-Silver, that
means that for every Silver condition Nf we can always find a sequence of in-
dividual choices x0 ∈ Nf whose associated social choice is 0, i.e., F (x0) = 0,
and another sequence x1 ∈ Nf whose social choice is 1, i.e. F (x1) = 1. That
in particular means that the single choices of the individuals j ∈ a play a
relevant role in the final decision. Hence, under this point of view non-Silver
sets looks “more democratic” than Silver sets, as they seem to pay more
attention on the single choices of each individual.
Remark 3.3. One might object that the coalition a of irrelevant individuals
may be very slim compared to its complement, and so that there is nothing
anti-democratic in that. For instance if
a := {1, 10, 100, 1000, . . . } := {10n : n ∈ ω}
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then the set of irrelevant individuals is very sparse compared to the set of
relevant individuals ac, and so it is plausible that the social choice function
F makes a decision which is not affected by individuals in a.
To overtake Remark 3.3, we need to consider Silver conditions having
non-small set a, so that the associated function f cannot consider irrelevant
any non-small set of individuals.
Before going to this study, we need to turn the intuitive observations
above into precise and formal definitions and notions.
Definition 3.4. Given a social choice function F : 2ω → {0, 1}, b ⊆ ω and
f : ω → {0, 1} partial function with dom(f) = bc, we say that b ⊆ ω is (F, f)-
irrelevant iff for every y, z ∈ Nf := {x ∈ 2
ω : ∀n ∈ dom(f)(f(n) = x(n))},
one has F (z) = F (y) (or in other words Nf ⊆ F or Nf ∩ F = ∅).
We say that b ⊆ ω is F -irrelevant iff there exists a partial function f :
ω → {0, 1} with dom(f) = bc such that b is (F, f)-irrelevant.
Definition 3.4 formalizes the idea that given b ⊆ ω being F -irrelevant
means that there is an f deciding the individual choices of all other members
not in b which makes the choice of all members in b irrelevant for the final
collective choice F .
In the following definitions, I ⊆ P(ω) should be understood as a family of
small sets (e.g., in many cases I is an ideal). Moreover we use the notation
I+ :={b ⊆ ω : b /∈ I}
I∗ :={b ⊆ ω : bc ∈ I}
Definition 3.5. Let F be a social choice function.
We say that F is anti-democratic w.r.t. I+ (or simply I+-anti-democratic)
iff there exists b ∈ I+, b is F -irrelevant.
We say that F is anti-democratic w.r.t. I∗ (or simply I∗-anti-democratic)
iff there exists b ∈ I∗, b is F -irrelevant.
Definition 3.5 essentially asserts that a collective choice F is anti-democratic
if it ignores a coalition of voters which is considered not small.
Example 3.6. A social choice function F satisfying the Silver property is
Fin
+-anti-democratic, where Fin := {b ⊆ ω : b is finite}.
Example 3.7. Let I := {{n} : n ∈ ω}, which means I is the family consisting
only of all singletons, and let F be a social choice function. If F satisfies
dictatorship (in the Arrowian sense), then F is I∗-anti-democratic. Hence
dictatorship in the Arrowian sense can be viewed as a particular case of
anti-democratic behaviour as meant by Definition 3.5.
3.1. A brief digression regarding the Baire property. We now make
a short digression by considering also another case, even if we will not focus
on this line of research on this paper, but we consider it worth mentioning.
Let F ⊆ 2ω be a set satisfying the Baire property, and as above interpret F
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as a social choice function. Then there exists t ∈ 2<ω such that Nt ∩ F is
comeager or Nt ∩ F
c is comeager. So in other words, we can find t ∈ 2<ω
such that:
• for almost all x ∈ 2ω extending t, F (x) = 1, or
• for almost all x ∈ 2ω extending t, F (x) = 0.
The term “almost all” above means for “comeager many”, as the filter of
comeager sets is here interpret as a notion of largeness, in a similar fash-
ion as events with probability measure 1 are considered to happen “almost
certainly” (in that case by using the filter of measure 1 sets instead of the
comeager filter). In line with this example, one can generalize the above
definition as follows.
Definition 3.8. Let H ⊆ P(2ω) be a filter. Given a social choice function
F : 2ω → {0, 1}, b ⊆ ω and f : ω → {0, 1} partial function with dom(f) = bc,
we say that b ⊆ ω is H-almost (F, f)-irrelevant iff there exists B ∈ H for
every y, z ∈ Nf ∩B, one has F (z) = F (y).
We say that b ⊆ ω is H-almost F -irrelevant iff there exists a partial
function f : ω → {0, 1} with dom(f) = bc such that b is H-almost (F, f)-
irrelevant.
Definition 3.9. Let H ⊆ P(2ω) be a filter, and F a social choice function.
We say that F is (H, I+)-anti-democratic iff there exists b ∈ I+, b is
H-almost F -irrelevant.
We say that F is (H, I∗)-anti-democratic iff there exists b ∈ I∗, b is H-
almost F -irrelevant.
From the above observation, a social choice function F satisfying the Baire
property is (C, I∗)-anti-democratic, where I := Fin := {b ⊆ ω : b is finite}
and C denotes the comeager filter.
Note that one of the main limitations of our example above about the
Baire property concerns the notion of “almost all” associated with the comea-
ger filter. In fact, as we mentioned above, the notion of almost-all depends
on a given filter and in some cases one might also get a rather unnatural
interpretation. For instance, we can consider the well-known example of a
comeager set which has measure zero. In this case it looks not so reasonable
to consider such a set necessarily a large set.
4. Dense Silver sets
In this section we would like to avoid the objection from remark 3.3 and
consider a more appropriate ideal I (as Fin exhibits the limitations suggested
in Remark 3.3). We show that the notion of density associated with a subset
of natural numbers can well serve for our purpose.
Definition 4.1. Given a ⊆ ω, let αn :=
|a∩[0,n]|
n
and define the following:
• the density of a as d(a) := limn<ω αn
• the upper density of a as d(a) := lim supn<ω αn
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• the lower density of a as d(a) := lim infn<ω αn.
It is easy to check that d is not defined for every set, whereas upper
and lower density are always defined. Moreover d is defined exactly when
d(a) = d(a) = d(a). Throughout this section we consider the family
Dδ := {b ⊆ ω : d(b) ≤ δ}.
We use the notation D := D0 and note that D is an ideal.
We also introduce the notion of a tree and the standard notation associ-
ated, as it is useful to develop the arguments throughout this section.
Trees. Given s, t ∈ 2<ω the notation s ⊆ t means s is an initial segment
of t, s ⊂ t means s is a proper initial segment, s ⊥ t are incompatible
(i.e. neither s ⊆ t not t ⊆ s), and |t| := |dom(t)| denote the length of t.
We say that T ⊆ 2<ω is a tree iff T is closed under initial segments, i.e.
∀t ∈ T∀s ⊆ t(s ∈ T ). We call any t ∈ T a node of T . We also use the
following standard notation:
• the set of terminal nodes of T term(T ) := {t ∈ T : ¬∃s ∈ T (t ⊂ s)};
• the height of T as ht(T ) := sup{|t| : t ∈ T};
• the body of T as [T ] := {x ∈ 2ω : ∀n ∈ ω(x↾n ∈ T )};
• the set of splitting nodes of T Split(T ) := {t ∈ T : ta0 ∈ T ∧ ta1 ∈
T};
• the set of splitting levels of T Lev(T ) := {|t|+ 1 : t ∈ Split(T )}.
• for t ∈ Split(T ), j ∈ {0, 1}, put SplSucc(ta〈j〉) be the shortest split-
ting node extending ta〈j〉.
Note that for any Nf ∈ V there exists an infinite tree T such that [T ] = Nf .
These are called Silver trees (see [6]). Note that dom(f)c = Lev(T ).
Definition 4.2. Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that Nf is a δ-dense Silver condition
(and write Nf ∈ Vδ) iff Nf is a Silver condition and d(dom(f)c) ≥ δ.
We say that Nf is an upper dense Silver condition (and write Nf ∈ V∗)
iff Nf is a Silver condition and d(dom(f)
c) > 0.
Note that V0 = V. Like for V, for every Nf ∈ Vδ there exists a tree T
such that [T ] = Nf . As above we can analogously define the notion of a
Vδ-set. A standard argument shows that AC implies the existence of non-
Vδ-sets and non-V∗-sets. We now want to show the non-constructive nature
of a non-Vδ-set. Use the following notation
NB := there is a non-Baire set
NV := there is a non-V set
NVδ := there is a non-Vδ set
NUV := there is a non-V∗ set
Note that if a social choice function F is a non-V∗ set, then F is not
D+-anti-democratic. In particular the example given by the sparse sets as
considered in Remark 3.3 does not occur any longer. In fact, given any
social choice function F which is a V∗-set, and b ⊆ ω, if b is F -irrelevant,
10 GIORGIO LAGUZZI
then b ∈ D+ per definition. Note that if we consider the case of a V1 social
choice function, then the irrelevant set b has full upper density, i.e. d(b) = 1.
Lemma 4.3. Fix δ ∈ [0, 1]. For every comeager set C there is Nf ∈ Vδ
such that Nf ⊆ C.
Proof. Fix δ ∈ [0, 1]. Let Dn : n ∈ ω be a ⊆-decreasing sequence of open
dense sets such that
⋂
n∈ωDn ⊆ C. Recall that if D is open dense, then
∀s ∈ 2<ω there exists s′ ⊇ s such that Ns′ ⊆ D. We build T ∈ Vδ by
recursively constructing its nodes as follows.
• First pick t∅ ∈ 2
<ω such that Nt∅ ⊆ D0, and then let
F0 :=
⋃
{t∅
as : s ∈ 2|t∅|}
T0 :={t
′ ∈ 2<ω : ∃t ∈ F0(t
′ ⊆ t)}.
• Assume Fn and Tn already defined. Let {tj : j ≤ J} enumerate
all nodes in Fn, which are all terminal nodes in Tn. We proceed
inductively as follows: pick r0 ∈ 2
<ω such that N
t
a
0
r0
⊆ Dn+1; then
pick r1 ⊇ r0 such that Nta
1
r1
⊆ Dn+1; proceed inductively in this
way for every j ≤ J , so rj ⊇ rj−1 such that Nta
j
rj
⊆ Dn+1. Finally
put h = n · |tarJ | for t ∈ term(Tn). Then define
Fn+1 :=
⋃
{tarJ
as : t ∈ term(Tn), s ∈ 2
h}
Tn+1 :={t
′ ∈ 2<ω : ∃t ∈ Fn+1(t
′ ⊆ t)}.
Note that by construction for all t ∈ Fn+1 we have Nt ⊆ Dn+1.
Moreover by the choice of h it follows that
(4.1)
|Lev(Tn+1)|
|ht(Tn+1)|
≥ δ(1 −
1
n
).
Finally put T :=
⋃
n∈ω Tn. By construction [T ] ∈ Vδ as 4.1 implies that
d(Lev(T )) = δ.
It is left to check [T ] ⊆
⋂
n∈ω ∈ Dn. To show that, fix arbitrarily x ∈ [T ]
and n ∈ ω. By construction there is t ∈ Fn such that t ⊂ x and since
Nt ⊆ Dn we then get x ∈ Nt ⊆ Dn. 
Corollary 4.4. NV⇒ NUV⇒ NVδ ⇒ NB
Proof. The first two implications are immediate. For the third one NVδ ⇒
NB just recall that if F satisfies the Baire property, then F is meager or
there exists t ∈ 2<ω such that Nt ∩ F is comeager. In the former case,
Lemma 4.3 gives T ∈ Vδ such that [T ] ∩ F = ∅, while in the latter case the
Lemma gives T ∈ Vδ such that [T ] ⊆ F (with stem(T ) ⊇ t). 
So in Shelah’s model where all sets have the Baire property, we also get
¬NVδ. Moreover the following two lemmata show that the existence of
non-Vδ sets requires a strictly larger fragment of AC than the existence of
non-Baire sets, and indeed we can build a model where all sets satisfy the
Vδ-property, but there is a Σ12 non-Baire set.
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Lemma 4.5. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] and T ∈ Vδ. Let ϕ¯ : Split(T ) → 2<ω such that
ϕ¯(stem(T )) := 〈〉 and for every t ∈ Split(T ) and j ∈ {0, 1},
ϕ¯(SplSucc(ta〈j〉)) := ϕ¯(t)a〈j〉.
Put ϕ : [T ] → 2ω be the expansion of ϕ¯, i.e. for every x ∈ [T ], ϕ(x) :=⋃
n∈ω ϕ¯(tn), where tn : n ∈ ω is a ⊆-increasing sequence of splitting nodes
in T such that x =
⋃
n∈ω tn.
If c is Cohen generic over V , then
V [c] |= ∃T ′ ∈ Vδ ∧ T
′ ⊆ T ∧ ∀x ∈ [T ′](ϕ(x) is Cohen over V ),
Proof. Consider the following forcing P consisting of finite trees p ⊆ 2<ω
such that ∀s, t ∈ term(p), |s| = |t| ordered by end-extension: p′ ≤ p iff
p′ ⊇ p and ∀t ∈ p′ \ p∃s ∈ term(p)(s ⊆ t).
Note P is countable and non-trivial, thus it is equivalent to Cohen forcing
C. Let TG :=
⋃
G, whereG is P-generic over V . We claim that T ′ := ϕ¯−1”TG
satisfies the required properties. It is left to show that:
(1) for every x ∈ [T ′] one has ϕ(x) is Cohen, i.e., every y ∈ [TG] is
Cohen;
(2) T ′ ∈ Vδ.
For proving (1), let D be an open dense subset of C and p ∈ P. It is
enough to find p′ ≤ p such that every t ∈ term(p′) is a member of D.
The idea is the same as in the proof of Lemma 4.3. Let {tj : j < N}
enumerate all terminal nodes in p and pick rJ , so that for every j < N ,
N
t
a
j
rJ
⊆ D. Then put p′ := {t ∈ 2<ω : ∃tj ∈ term(p)(t ⊆ t
a
j rJ}. Hence
p′ ≤ p and p′  ∀y ∈ [TG]∃t ∈ p
′ ∩D(t ⊂ y). Hence we have proven that
C ∀y ∈ [TG]∃t ∈ D(t ⊂ y),
which means every y ∈ [TG] is Cohen over V .
For proving (2), it is enough to note that, given k ∈ ω and p ∈ P arbi-
trarily, one can find q ≤ p such that
(4.2)
|Lev(ϕ¯−1”q)|
ht(ϕ¯−1”q)
≥ δ(1 −
1
2k
).
That means for every k ∈ ω the set Ek consisting of q’s as in (4.2) is dense,
and so Lev(T ′) has upper density ≥ δ. 
Proposition 4.6. Let G be Cω1-generic over V . There is an inner model
M of V [G] such that
M |= ∀F ⊆ 2ω∀Nf ∈ Vδ∃Ng ≤ Nf (Ng ⊆ F ∨Ng ∩ F = ∅).
(In particular, in M every F ⊆ 2ω satisfies the Vδ-property.)
Proof. The argument is standard and is essentially the same as in the proof
of [6, Proposition 3.7]. For the reader convenience and for the sake of com-
pleteness, we give some details. Fix δ ∈ [0, 1]. Let G be Cω1-generic over
V .
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Let F be an Onω-definable set of reals, i.e. F := {x ∈ 2ω : Φ(x, v)} for
a formula Φ with parameter v ∈ Onω, and let Nf ∈ Vδ. We aim to find
Ng ≤ Nf such that Ng ⊆ F or Ng ∩ F = ∅.
First note that we can absorb v and Nf in the ground model, i.e, we can
find α < ω1 such that v,Nf ∈ V [G↾α]. Let ϕ : Nf → 2
ω be as in Lemma
4.5. Let c = G(α) be the next Cohen real and write C for the α-component
of Cω1.
There are b0 =
qJ(Φ(ϕ−1(c), v))KCα = 0
y
C and b1 =
qJΦ(ϕ−1(c), v))KCα =
1
y
C, and by C-homogeneity b0 ∧ b1 = 0 and b0∨ b1 = 1. Hence, by applying
Lemma 4.5, one can then find Ng ≤ Nf such that Ng ⊆ b0 or Ng ⊆ b1 and
for every x ∈ Ng, ϕ(x) is Cohen over V [G↾α]. We claim that Ng satisfies
the required property.
• Case Ng ⊆ b1: note for every x ∈ Ng, ϕ(x) is Cohen over V [G↾α],
and so V [G↾α][ϕ(x)] |= JΦ(ϕ−1(ϕ(x)), v) = 1KCω1 . Hence V [G] |=
∀x ∈ Ng(Φ(x, v)), which means V [G] |= Ng ⊆ F .
• CaseNf ⊆ b0: we argue analogously and get V [G] |= ∀x ∈ Ng(¬Φ(x, v)),
which means V [G] |= Ng ∩ F = ∅.

The limitations showed in this section actually provides also rather neg-
ative insights about the definability of non-democratic collective functions.
As we know that in ZFC one can prove that every Σ11 set satisfies the Baire
property, and due to NUV⇒ NB we then obtain the following.
Corollary 4.7. Every Σ11 social choice function is D
+-anti-democratic.
Even if in a different setting, this expectation is in line with Mihara’s [20]
and [21], where it is proven that social choice function a´ la Fishburg cannot
have a recursive nature. Hence, the corollary above should be understood
as another signal that non-democratic social choice functions seem to be
hardly definable.
Another consequence we get is the following. We go back to analyse the
role of AD in this context in the concluding remarks.
Corollary 4.8. Assume AD. Then every social choice function is D+-anti-
democratic.
5. More than two alternatives
We now analyse the case when each individual can choose among a set
with more than two alternatives. In particular we distinguish the case when
there are finitely many alternatives, i.e. A := {ai : i < K}, with K > 2
finite, and ω alternatives, i.e. A := {ai : i ∈ ω}.
5.1. Finitely many alternatives. We start with the former case. So
w.l.o.g let A = K (for some finite K > 2) be the set of alternatives that each
individual i ∈ ω can choose, i.e. x(i) ∈ K. We can develop the notion of
Silver-like conditions in a similar fashion as in the previous sections; given
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f : ω → K partial function, let Nf := {x ∈ K
ω : ∀n ∈ ω(x(n) = f(n))}.
Moreover we can naturally generalizes the notion of Silver and dense Silver
forcing in this context, and we refer to them as VK and VδK .
In this framework, we think of a social choice function as an F : Kω →
K, i.e. F selects the collectively preferred candidate in K for every given
sequence x ∈ Kω of individual choices. In this framework with more than
two alternatives, the suitable version of Silver property generalises as follows.
Definition 5.1. Let F : Kω → K be a social choice function, and H :=
{hi : i < k}, with k ≤ K, be a family of pairwise disjoint subsets of K.
We say that F satisfies the (VδK ,H)-property iff for every Nf ∈ VδK
there exists Ng ≤ Nf and h ∈ H such that ∀x ∈ Ng, F (x) ∈ h.
We say that F satisfies the VδK-property iff for every Nf ∈ VδK there
exists Ng ≤ Nf and k ∈ K such that ∀x ∈ Ng, F (x) = k.
We can easily check that Lemma 4.6 also holds for the VδK-property.
Fix arbitrarily K > 2. The idea simply relies on the following recursive
argument. Let F : Kω → K be a social choice function and Nf ∈ VδK .
Start with H0 := {h0, h
′
0} partition of K; we can use the same argument as
in Lemma 4.6 in order to obtain Nf0 ≤ Nf such that
∀x ∈ Nf0(F (x) ∈ h0) ∨ ∀x ∈ Nf0(F (x) ∈ h
′
0).
W.l.o.g. assume the former case occurs and pick h0 (otherwise we use the
same argument by picking h′0). Then pick H1 := {h1, h
′
1} partition of h and
use again the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.6 in order to find
Nf1 ≤ Nf0 such that
∀x ∈ Nf1(F (x) ∈ h1) ∨ ∀x ∈ Nf1(F (x) ∈ h
′
1).
It is clear that one can recursively proceed similarly as soon as we find
Nfm ≤ Nf and hm consisting of a single element k ∈ K, and so ∀x ∈ Nfm ,
one has F (x) = k, as desired.
Also, an analog of Lemma 4.3 holds in this case with K alternatives.
5.2. Infinitely many alternatives. Let A = ω and define Nf := {x ∈
ωω : ∀n ∈ ω(x(n) = f(n))}, for a given partial function f : ω → ω, and
consider the analog Silver-like forcing in ωω denoted by V∞. Definition
5.1 naturally generalises in the infinite case as well, simply by replacing
the natural number K with ω. However the situation with infinitely many
alternatives gives rise to very different results, as we show in this section.
Trees associated with conditions in V∞ are a particular kind of the fol-
lowing forcing notion, which has been studied in [13]: we say that a tree
T ⊆ ω<ω is a full-Miller tree (in symbol T ∈ FM) iff for every s ∈ T there
exists t ⊇ s such that for all n ∈ ω, tan ∈ T .
Note that V∞ ⊆ FM. The forcing FM adds Cohen reals (see [13]) and
the same argument shows V∞ adds Cohen reals. As a consequence, in line
with the proof of [15, Proposition 4.4], one can prove NB ⇒ NV∞, where
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NV∞ is the statement asserting that there exists a non-V∞-set, in line with
the notation introduced in Section 4.
Moreover Brendle showed that Lemma 4.5 does not hold in such a case,
which means that Cohen forcing C cannot add a tree T ∈ FM (and a fortiori
cannot add T ∈ V∞).
Proposition 5.2 (Brendle, [4]). C does not add a condition Nf ∈ V∞ of
Cohen reals.
(Brendle actually proves this result for the Miller forcing and so in par-
ticular holds for V∞.)
But FM and V∞ are different under another point of view, which is par-
ticularly significant in our framework of social choice theory. In fact, while
for FM an analog of Lemma 4.3 holds, for V∞ it fails.
Lemma 5.3. There exists a comeager set C ⊆ ωω such that for every Nf ∈
V∞, Nf * C.
Proof. Let en denote the constantly equal 0 sequence of length n, i.e. |en| =
n and ∀i < n(en(i) = 0). We define a ⊆-decreasing sequence {Cn : n ∈ ω}
of open dense sets as follows:
• let h0 : ω
<ω → ω<ω be such that, for every s ∈ ω<ω, j ∈ ω, let
h0(s
a〈j〉) := saes(0)
a . . .a es(|s|−1)
aej (note that for s = 〈〉 we have
h0(〈j〉) = ej). Then put
C0 :=
⋃
s∈ω<ω
Nh0(s).
• let hn+1 : ω
<ω → ω<ω be such that, for every s ∈ ω<ω, j ∈ ω, let
hn+1(s
a〈j〉) := saes(0)
a . . .a es(|s|−1)
aej
aen+1, and then put
Cn+1 :=
⋃
s∈ω<ω
Nhn+1(s).
Note that for every s ∈ ω<ω, hn+1(s) ⊇ hn(s), and so Cn+1 ⊆ Cn.
By construction, each Cn is open dense. Put C :=
⋂
n∈ω Cn. We aim to
show:
(5.1) ∀Nf ∈ V∞∃x ∈ Nf \ C,
and so we have to show that for every Nf ∈ V∞ there exist x ∈ ωω and
n ∈ ω such that x ∈ Nf and x /∈ Cn. So fix Nf ∈ V∞ arbitrarily and let
Tf be the corresponding tree such that [Tf ] = Nf , and let {aj : j ∈ ω}
enumerate all elements in dom(f)c. Let t0 := f↾[0, a0) = stem(Tf ) and pick
n > a0 + 1; fix the notation Em :=
⋃
s∈ω<m hn(s). For every s ∈ ω
<a0 and
j ∈ ω we get
hn(s
a〈j〉) ⊇ saen,
and since, by the choice of n, for every s ∈ ω<a0 and k > 0 one has saen ⊥
t0
a〈k〉 we therefore get Ea0 ∩Nta
0
〈k〉
= ∅.
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Then take j1 > a1+1 and put t1 := t0
a〈j1〉
af↾(a0, a1); in particular, note
that Ek0∩Nt1 = ∅. By definition hn(t0
a〈j1〉
a〈f(a0 + 1)〉) ⊇ t0
a〈j1〉
aej1
aen,
and similarly for every s ⊆ f↾(a0, a1), we have
hn(t0
a〈j1〉
as) ⊇ t0
a〈j1〉
as↾|s|−1
aes(|s|−1)
aej1
aen
Hence, since |ej1 | = j1 > a1 + 1 > |f↾(a0, a1)|, it follows, by the same
argument as above, for every k > 0, Ea1 ∩Nta
1
k
= ∅.
Then we can proceed following the same procedure and recursively build
the sequences {tm : m ∈ ω} such that tm ⊆ tm+1 and for every m ∈ ω,
Ntm+1 ∩Eam = ∅. Finally put x :=
⋃
m∈ω tm. By construction each tm ∈ Tf
and so x ∈ [Tf ] = Nf . We claim
x /∈
⋃
m∈ω
Eam .
Indeed, assume there is l ∈ ω such that x ∈ Eal ; then we would have⋂
m∈ω Ntm = x ∈ Eal , contradicting the fact that Ntl+1 ∩ Eal = ∅.
The proof is then complete, as
⋃
m∈ω Eam = Cn. 
Proposition 5.4. There exists F ⊆ ωω such that for every Nf ∈ V∞ one
has Nf ∩ F 6= ∅ and Nf * F .
If we identify F with its characteristic function, Proposition 5.4 asserts
that:
(5.2) ∀Nf ∈ V∞(∃x0(F (x0) = 0) ∧ ∃x1(F (x1) = 1).
Note that this is not enough to get a social choice function for infinite
alternatives which is not Fin+-anti-democratic, as the F is 5.2 only range
into {0, 1} and not ω. However, we conjecture that Proposition 5.4 might
be improved for F : ωω → ω.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. The construction is very similar to that one in the
proof of Lemma 5.3. The difference here is that we build the hn’s in order
to work as maps from V∞ → V∞ instead of maps from ω<ω to ω<ω. For
ease of notation we write f ∈ V∞ since the condition Nf is completely
determined by its associated partial function f . We also use the following
notation: given a partial function f : ω → ω with co-infinite domain, let
{aj : j ∈ ω} enumerate all elements in dom(f)
c, and t ∈ ω<ω we define the
partial function f ⊕ t ∈ V∞ as follows:
(5.3) (f ⊕ t)(n) =
{
f(n) if n ∈ dom(f)
t(j) if n = aj ∧ j < |t|.
Clearly Nf⊕t ≤ Nf . Moreover, given {ti : i ≤ N}, with natural number
N > 0, we also recursively define f
⊕
i≤N tj := (f
⊕
i<N ti) ⊕ tN . We then
define Gn’s recursively as follows:
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• let G0 : V∞ → V∞ be such that, for every f ∈ V∞, with dom(f)c :=
{afj : j ∈ ω}, let
G0(f ∪ {a
f
0 , j}) := (f
⊕
i<a
f
0
ef(i))⊕ ej .
(Note that for if af0 = 0 we get G0(f ∪ {a
f
0 , j}) := f ⊕ ej; and if
f = 〈〉 we get G0(f ∪ {a
f
0 , j}) := ej). Then put
F0 :=
⋃
{[G0(f ∪ {a
f
0 , j})] : f ∈ V∞ ∧ j ∈ ω}.
Note that F0 is defined in such a way that it is V∞-open dense, which
means
∀Nf ∈ V∞∃Ng ≤ Nf (Ng ⊆ F0).
• for n > 0, let Gn : V∞ → V∞ be such that, for every f ∈ V∞, with
dom(f)c := {afj : j ∈ ω}, let
Gn(f ∪ {a
f
0 , j}) := (f
⊕
i<a
f
0
ef(i))⊕ ej ⊕ en.
Then put
Fn :=
⋃
{[Gn(f ∪ {a
f
0 , j})] : f ∈ V∞ ∧ j ∈ ω}.
Note that Fn is V∞-open dense, and Fn+1 ⊆ Fn.
Finally put F :=
⋂
n∈ω Fn. We claim that F has the desired property.
Fix arbitrarily Nf ∈ V∞. We can build a sequence {tm : m ∈ ω} of nodes
in Nf following the same procedure as in Lemma 5.3, pick n > a
f
0 + 1 and
then define y :=
⋃
m∈ω tm such that y ∈ Nf . In this case, by construction
we have tm+1 /∈ Am, where Am is defined as
Am :=
⋃
{[Gn(Ng)] : Ng ∈ V∞ ∧ a
g
0 < a
f
m}.
Since Fn =
⋃
m∈ω Am we the get y /∈ Fn. This complete the proof that
Nf 6⊆ F .
Showing that Nf ∩ F 6= ∅ is even simpler, as it is sufficient to define the
following:
(5.4) x(n) :=
{
f(n) if n ∈ dom(f)
0 if ∃j ∈ ω(n = afj ).
It is clear that x ∈ Nf . To check that x ∈ F , it is enough to note that
x ∈
⋂
n∈ω
[Gn(f ∪ {a
f
0 , 0})],
and since [Gn(f ∪ {a
f
0 , 0})] ⊆ Fn, we obtain x ∈ F .

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6. Equity and Pareto principles vs anti-democratic social
choice functions
A well-studied field in economic theory consists of social welfare relations
on infinite utility streams.
We consider a set of utility levels Y (or utility domain) totally ordered,
and we call X := Y ω the corresponding space of infinite utility streams. In
some setting Y is usually also endowed with some topology and X with the
induced product topology, but in our context we do not need any topological
setting. Given x, y ∈ X we write x ≤ y iff ∀n ∈ ω(x(n) ≤ y(n)), and x < y
iff x ≤ y ∧ ∃n ∈ ω(x(n) < y(n)). Furthermore we set F := {pi : ω → ω :
finite permutation}, and we define, for x ∈ X, fpi(x) := 〈x(pi(n)) : n ∈ ω〉.
We say that a subset  of X ×X is a social welfare relation (SWR) on
X iff  is reflexive and transitive, and let ∼ denote the equivalence relation
x ∼ y ⇔ x  y ∧ y  x. If x  y and x 6∼ y we write x ≺ y.
In economic theory some equity and efficiency principles are well-studied;
we focus on three of the most popular ones.
Definition 6.1. A social welfare relation  is called finitely anonymous
(FA) (or satisfying finite anonymity) iff for every pi ∈ F we have fpi(x) ∼ x.
Definition 6.2. A social welfare relation satisfies strong equity (SE) iff for
every x, y ∈ X such that there exist i, j ∈ ω, i 6= j, such that x(i) < y(i) <
y(j) < x(j) and for all k 6= i, j, x(k) = y(k), then x ≺ y.
Definition 6.3. A social welfare relation  is called Paretian (P) (or sat-
isfying Pareto principle) iff ∀x, y ∈ X(x < y ⇒ x ≺ y).
The first two are considered equity principles: FA essentially means that
when we interchange the positions of two (or finitely many) individuals the
SWR does not change the ranking; SE can be understood as a principle
saying that if we consider an income distribution x and we increase the
income of a poor person i and decrease the income of a rich person j (and
leave the income of the others as they are) then we get y which is better-off
than x; P is understood as an efficiency principle, in fact if a stream y is
everywhere larger than another stream x and it is strictly larger for at least
one individuals, than y is strictly preferred than x.
In recent years total SWR satisfying combinations of these principles were
proven to have a non-constructive nature ([22], [17], [10], [16], [11]). We want
to show that some combinations of these principles are in a sense able to
provide social welfare functions which are not D+δ -anti-democratic, for δ ≥
2
3
where we recall
Dδ := {x ∈ 2
ω : d(x) ≤ δ}.
In the following proposition, keeping in mind the interpretation of SE
given above, we could think of the utility levels a < b < c < d as: a := poor
class, b = lower-middle class, c = upper-middle class, d = rich class.
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Proposition 6.4. Let  denote a SWR satisfying SE and FA on X = Y ω,
where Y := {a, b, c, d} with a < b < c < d. Then there exists a social choice
function F which is not D+δ -anti-democratic, for any δ ∈ (
2
3 , 1].
Proof. We use the following notation. Given f : ω → {0, 1} partial function,
let U(f) := {n ∈ ω : f(n) = 1}. Given x ∈ 2ω let {nk : k ∈ ω} enumerate
U(x), Ik := [2nk, 2nk+1) and
O(x) :=
⋃
k∈Odd
Ik and E(x) :=
⋃
k∈Even
Ik.
Then define o(x), e(x) ∈ Y ω as follows
(6.1) o(x)(n) :=


a if n ∈ [0, n0) ∩ Even
d if n ∈ [0, n0) ∩Odd
b if n ∈ E(x) ∩ Even
c if n ∈ E(x) ∩Odd
a if n ∈ O(x) ∩ Even
d if n ∈ O(x) ∩Odd
(6.2) e(x)(n) :=


a if n ∈ [0, n0) ∩ Even
d if n ∈ [0, n0) ∩Odd
a if n ∈ E(x) ∩ Even
d if n ∈ E(x) ∩Odd
b if n ∈ O(x) ∩ Even
c if n ∈ O(x) ∩Odd
Let  be a SWR satisfying SE and FA, and put
F := {x ∈ 2ω : e(x) ≺ o(x)} .
We aim to show F is a non-Vδ-set. In particular, this means F is the
social choice function we were looking for, as a non-Vδ-set is not D
+
δ -anti-
democratic, for any fixed δ ∈ (23 , 1].
Given any Nf ∈ Vδ, let {nk : k ∈ ω} enumerate all natural numbers in
dom(f)c ∪ U(f). Our goal is to find x, z ∈ Nf such that x ∈ F ⇔ z /∈ F .
First we observe an easy combinatorial structure of conditions in Vδ.
Claim 6.5. Let A ⊆ ω be such that d(A) > 23 . Then there are infinitely wj
such that for every j < ω, one has wj ⊆ A, |wj | = 3 and there exist hj ∈ ω
so that wj = {hj , hj + 1, hj + 2}.
The proof of the claim is an easy counting-argument. Indeed, note that
d(A) > 23 there are {ki : i < ω} such that for every i < ω,
|A∩ki|
ki
> 23 + ε,
for some ε > 0. Then it is easy to see that any block A ∩ [ki, ki+1) should
contain a triple as in the claim.
We pick x ∈ Nf such that for all nk ∈ dom(f)
c ∪ U(f), x(nk) = 1. Let
{wj : j ∈ ω} list all triples as in the claim, applied with A = dom(f)
c.
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We have to consider three cases.
• e(x) ≺ o(x): Note x ∈ F . Pick nl ∈ w0 such that l ∈ Even and
define y ∈ 2ω as follows:
y(n) =
{ x(n) if n 6= nl
0 if n = nl.
Roughly speaking, y is obtained by dropping nl from x. Note we
have
∀n ≥ nl, o(y)(n) = e(x)(n)
∀n ≥ nl, e(y)(n) = o(x)(n)
Let
O(l) :=
⋃
k<l,k∈Odd
Ik and E(l) :=
⋃
k<l,k∈Even
Ik.
Pick J ∈ ω large enough, nj , nj + 1 ∈ dom(f)
c (for every j ∈ J)
such that j ∈ Odd and 2 · J > |E(l)| + 2; note that nj + 1 = nj+1
since we choose nj, nj + 1 ∈ wij , for some ij ∈ ω. Then define
z(n) =
{ y(n) if n /∈ {nj , nj + 1 : j < J}
0 otherwise.
Roughly speaking, z is obtained by dropping the nj’s and nj + 1’s
from y.
Note that by definition for every j ∈ J , o(z)(2nj) = a and
o(z)(2nj + 1) = d. Now let {ej : j < J
′} and {oj : j < J
′} be
increasing enumerations, respectively, of all even numbers and odd
numbers in E(l); note that by choice of J we have J ′ < J . Then we
have the following.
– For all j < J ′, one has o(z)(ej) = b = e(x)(2nj) and o(z)(oj) =
c = e(x)(2nj+1), while e(x)(ej) = a = o(z)(2nj) and e(x)(oj) =
d = o(z)(2nj +1) . Now pick pi ∈ F such that for every j < J
′,
pi(ej) = 2nj and pi(oj) = 2nj+1; note that there exists j ∈ J\J
′
such that 2nj /∈ dom(pi) and o(z)(2nj) = a < e(x)(2nj) = b <
e(x)(2nj +1) = c < o(z)(2nj +1) = d; hence o(z) ∼ fpi(o(z)) ≺
e(x).
– Analogously, for all j < J ′, one has e(z)(ej) = a = o(x)(2nj)
and e(z)(oj) = d = o(x)(2nj+1), while o(x)(ej) = b = e(z)(2nj)
and o(x)(oj) = c = e(z)(2nj+1). Pick the same pi ∈ F as above,
i.e., such that for every j < J ′, pi(ej) = 2nj and pi(oj) = 2nj+1;
note that there exists j ∈ J \ J ′ such that 2nj /∈ dom(pi) and
o(x)(2nj) = a < e(z)(2nj) = b < e(z)(2nj+1) = c < o(x)(2nj+
1) = d; then o(x) ∼ fpi(o(x)) ≺ e(z).
The two points together gives o(z) ≺ e(z), i.e. z /∈ F .
• case o(x) ≺ e(x): this case is analog to the preceding one, where
we just interchange the role of o(x) and e(x) in the construction,
in particular we start with x /∈ F and we get z ∈ F and in the
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construction we have to permute the elements in O(l) instead of
E(l).
• case e(x) ∼ o(x): Note x /∈ F . Pick one triple wj and nj, nj+1 ∈ wj
such that j ∈ Odd, and define
y(n) =
{ 0 if (n = nj ∨ n = nj + 1)
x(n) else
By construction we obtain
– ∀n /∈ Ij := {2nj , 2nj + 1}, o(y)(n) = o(x)(n), otherwise one
has o(x)(2nj) = a < o(y)(2nj) = b < o(y)(2nj + 1) = c <
o(x)(2nj + 1) = d. Hence o(x) ≺ o(y).
– ∀n /∈ Ij, e(y)(n) = e(x)(n), otherwise one has e(y)(2nj) = a <
e(x)(2nj) = b < e(x)(2nj + 1) = c < e(y)(2nj + 1) = d. Hence
e(y) ≺ e(x).
Hence e(y) ≺ e(x) ∼ o(x) ≺ o(y), i.e. y ∈ F .

Proposition 6.6. Let  denote a SWR satisfying P and FA on X = Y ω,
where Y := {0, 1}. Then there exists a social choice function F which is not
D+δ -anti-democratic, for any δ ∈ (
2
3 , 1]
Proof. The structure is very similar to the one above for SE and FA. The
difference is that in this case we define Ik := [nk, nk+1) and then
(6.3) o(x)(n) :=


0 if n ∈ [0, n0)
1 if n ∈ E(x)
0 if n ∈ O(x)
(6.4) o(x)(n) :=


0 if n ∈ [0, n0)
0 if n ∈ E(x)
1 if n ∈ O(x)
The rest of the proof, splitting into the three cases, works following the same
passages and we leave it to the reader. 
Remark 6.7. It remains open what happens if one combines SE and P, with-
out FA. Assume there is a total SWR satisfying SE and P, can we then
obtain a social choice function which is not D+δ -anti-democratic?
7. A word about uncountable populations
Assume P = κ, for κ uncountable. Following the line of the previous
section, we should find a version of Silver conditions in 2κ with the property
that the set of splitting levels be non-small. We consider the club filter
Club consisting of supersets of closed and unbounded subsets of κ. Let NS
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be the non-stationary ideal, i.e. NS := {x ∈ 2κ : xc ∈ Club}. Then let
VClubκ := V(NS
∗) consist of those conditions of the form
Nf := {x ∈ 2
κ : ∀α ∈ dom(f)(x(α) = f(α))},
with dom(f) ∈ NS.
In [14, Lemma 4.1] it was proven that the club filer does not satisfy the
VClubκ -property, i.e. for every Nf ∈ V
Club
κ
Nf ∩Club 6= ∅ and Nf 6⊆ Club.
Note that following the interpretation of Section 2, this means that if we
view Club as a social choice function denoted by FClub, then given any large
set a of individuals, i.e. a ∈ Club, then a is not FClub-irrelevant. In fact we
can always find a distribution of individuals choices in a that generates a
branch in Club (i.e. for which the social choice function FClub takes value 1)
and another distribution of individual choices in a that generates a branch
not in Club (i.e. for which the social choice function FClub takes value 0).
In terms of Definition 3.5 we have then the following.
Corollary 7.1. FClub is not NS∗-anti-democratic.
Unfortunately, Corollary 7.1 cannot be improved to obtain social func-
tions which are not NS+-anti-democratic. Indeed, if we consider V(NS+) we
then get a corresponding notion of V(NS+)-property that can be forced to
hold for every set, when κ is inaccessible. More precisely, in [14, Lemma 4.2],
in case κ be inaccessible, it is proven that a < κ-support iteration of length
κ+ of κ-Cohen forcing provides a model-extension where all Onκ-definable
subsets of 2κ satisfy the V(NS+)-property, and in the inner model L(κκ) of
this forcing extension all sets satisfy the V(NS+)-property. In other words,
the existence of a non-V(NS+)-set does not follow from the axiom of ZF
without AC, and so it has a non-constructive nature.
Question. If κ is not inaccessible, without using AC can we find an F ⊂ 2κ
which is not NS+-anti-democratic?
8. Concluding remarks
The common tread linking the results unfolded in the paper is that princi-
ples excluding non-democratic behaviour of social choice functions (e.g. gen-
eralizing the Arrowian non-dictatorship) reveals a non-constructive nature
independently of the other principles (such as Unanimity and Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives), and are therefore non-definable.
On the set-theoretic side, regularity properties of subsets of 2ω are usually
considered on the positive side, and on the contrary irregular sets are rather
considered as pathological ones. In the framework suggested by social choice
theory, this vision is reversed, as social choice functions satisfying notions
like Silver-property and dense Silver-property, even if in different forms, tend
to exhibit a non-democratic behaviour, since certain non-small coalitions are
systematically irrelevant in the final collective choice.
22 GIORGIO LAGUZZI
On the philosophical side, in the introduction we have dealt with the use
of infinite populations in the context of economic and social choice theory,
taking a position in line with Mihara’s. In this section we conclude with
some insights about the use of the axiom of choice AC and the axiom of
determinacy AD. The position we want to keep is somehow in between,
with some caution in the use of AD. On the one side, we agree with Litak
that a full and indiscriminate use of AC should be looked at with skepti-
cism, and even rejected. On the other side, we think that a full use of AD
can rise more than a suspect as well; indeed Corollary 7.1 suggests to also
consider a certain limitation in using AD, as it essentially asserts that in ev-
ery model of ZF+AD any social choice function exhibits a rather annoying
non-democratic behaviour.
As a consequence, rather than considering AD as an axiom to select the
appropriate applications where the use of infinite populations is legitimate,
we tend to support the idea of considering as more suitable models for social
choice theory on infinite populations also those satisfying certain fragments
of AC excluding situation as in Corollary 7.1. As an example of an inappro-
priate model, one can consider L(R)V [G] in Lemma 4.6. In fact, in L(R)V [G]
all social choice functions are D+δ -anti-democratic and simultaneously there
is a∆12-set non-Lebesgue measurable. Hence, L(R)
V [G] might be considered
unfit both from the point of view of social choice theory and from the point
of view of economic theory as well, the latter since it violates Aumann’s
statement: “Non-measurable sets are extremely “pathological”; it is unlike
that they would occur in the context of an economic model [3, pg. 44]”.
Under our consideration, a suitable model could be one where all sets
are Lebesgue measurable (and so satisfying ¬NL, ruling out Aumann’s
pathological situation) but simultaneously containing social choice functions
which exclude anti-democratic features. For example, non-Vδ-sets could
serve for the latter, but it is not clear whether one can have a model satisfying
NUV ∧ ¬NL. In fact, it is possible that a result like NB ⇒ NUV hold
by replacing NB with NL. In fact, it is not clear whether a result like in
Lemma 4.3 can be proven when replacing comeager sets with sets having
strictly positive measure.
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